Ⅱ．On The Validity of The Moral Horizon

i．The Unity of The Interests of Individual And The Interests of Others

Moral agents can indeed interact since they have a shared common ground of values, and this traces back to the mechanism of moral decision.We share a common moral ground because we are “in part” the products of our culture. As Blackburn says, we take in values by the very fact of learning the language. Morality comes unbidden. This is the customary morality that direets our initial emotive reaction to a problematic situation. Reflection turns such a hypothesis into moral judgments through inference to the best explanation, reflective morality. When making a moral decision, an agent needs to decide what is right or wrong to do. It is essential to notice that no theoretical guides at that moment can replace the role of the agent, the decider. As Holmes notes, no matter what theory the decider finally believes and acts in accordance with, the decider needs to choose to believe the moral theory and hence acts in accordance with the conduct that follows from that moral theory. A decider imagines the potential outcome of a moral decision and its influence on others through reflective deliberation. An agent also deliberates on how the others will respond in the dramatic rehearsal. The deliberation, the informed reflection of an agent, is crucial for moral conduct.

The dramatic rehearsal requires a common ground of values. This process of reflective deliberation begins with a problem to examine,while what action to choose is known as “dramatic rehearsal”. In fact,the dramatic rehearsal is a process by which one transcends one's own standpoint to reach a standpoint of shared values based on the common point of view: the point of view of those with whom one is in solidarity.At the end of inquiry, we would all live in solidarity. Dewey defines the dramatic rehearsal in the following sentences:

We give away, in our mind, to some impulse, and we try, in our mind, some plan... We find ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequences that would follow, and as we then express enjoyment and approval, or disgust and disapproval about these consequences, and we find the original impulse or plan good or bad. Deliberation is dramatic and active, not mathematical and impersonal.

So moral judgment looks like aesthetic judgment. The dramatic nature of the dramatic rehearsal requires interactions between persons in a moral community, just like actors and audiences collectively complete a drama through interactions on and off the stage. In other words, the deliberations of morality are analogous to those in the drama. Steven Fesmire argues,“the artist's anticipation of an audience enables a dialectical interaction that gives point and focuses to art. Communication is called forth, whether or not it is intended”. In essence, dramatic rehearsal requires a recognition of others, which causes people to interact with each other and to transcend the standpoint of a limited ego. Dewey summarizes the moral end as “the realization of a community of wills”. Sorrel also argues, “moral inquiry demands evaluation of present enjoyment of foreseen goods for oneself,and, at the same time, sympathetic understanding of others”. These examples all express the idea that the perspective of the individual and the perspective of the others is unified. There are differences since there is, as yet, no unified common point of view. But at the end of inquiry, the actually true and actually right are revealed in the long run.

ii．Objection of The Individualists

Now, a direct objection should be considered, which is closely associated with the notion of “individualism” and the “modern freedom”that follows it. In the past, people considered themselves as belonging to a larger order. For instance, people who lived in the medieval times considered themselves as belonging to the cosmic order, and people who lived before the era of atomic society considered themselves as members of families and communities. However, due to the development of the notion of individualism, many people reject these “larger orders,” and the current trend is characterized as “disenchantment” by Max Weber.

There is a popular proposition held by individualists, that is, “I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's. Similarly, the rightness of my action is and only is defined by myself, and no external order or external community can legitimately judge my moral action, and hence no one should judge others 'moral actions. ” This is the standard belief of individualists. This belief denies the existence of an external moral ground that unites oneself with others, and is a one-way street to relativism, namely, “Whatever I believe is right is right.”

iii．The Inescapable Horizon

The standard belief of individualists, however, is a false belief that misuses “authenticity” to defend a moral theory that cannot be justified. The horizon, the background against which we think and judge, is inescapable.Firstly, it is critical to notice that a person has a dialogical nature. Davidson argues that the very use of language indicates that we are already in communities. The fact that language is inter-translatable into other languages suggests that we begin embedded in a community that is itself embedded in humanity. We do not use language to define a concept by invoking self definition of a moral concept. Rather, we def ine the concept of morality in dialog with others and through conversations. Therefore, we necessarily think from a common point of view when making moral decisions.

Secondly, and even more importantly, any moral belief that denies the pre-existing moral ground is self-defeating, because it reduces morality to a trivial position which loses significance. This has been pointed out by Charles Taylor. The individualists intend to preserve the significance of morality by referring only to self-choice, but this demand is incompatible with the standard claim of individualists. The significance of moral values cannot be defended without invoking the pre-existence of the horizon:

In some forms this discourse slides towards an affirmation of choice itself. All options are equally worthy, because they are freely chosen, and it is choice that confers worth... But this implicitly denies the existence of a pre-existing horizon of significance, whereby some things are worthwhile and others less so, and still others not at all, quite anterior to choice. But then the choice of sexual orientation loses any special significance. It is on a level with any other preferences, like that for taller or shorter sexual partners... No one would dream of making discriminating judgements about these preferences, but that's because they are all without importance. They really do depending on how you feel. Once sexual orientation comes to be assimilated to these, the original goal, which was to assert the equal value of this orientation, is subtly frustrated. Difference so asserted becomes insignificant.

In this case, sexual preferences are relatively trivial. Morality as merely individual preferences, just like sexual preference, is not significant since it is nothing more than a personal feeling. Even the very idea that the significance of one's moral actions and one's life come from self-determination depends on a presupposition that there is something desirable, noble, and therefore significant to pursue. Otherwise, the choice is nothing more than a trivial, arbitrary decision.

Moreover, if person A believes moral proposition P and person B believes moral proposition not-P, they are both correct and do not disagree. There are no moral dilemmas in moral relativism. It reduces morality to merely a question of power since there is no sustainable referential system.

Moral value and moral judgment are tasks that are completed inherently. The moral agents involved in the situation give the significance of moral value to an action, and this is not merely a trivial matter of individual preference. For instance, people cannot say that the most critical task of their entire lives is to eat two grams of dust every day without any explanation and expect to be understood. However,once they explain, their explanation that defines the value becomes the basis for a dialogical conversation that involves others and hence the moral horizon.

Therefore, the moral horizon is an inescapable character of morality,so people share a common value ground with each other: customary morality from which we all begin and transform into reflective morality.This conclusion allows people to interact from a common ground of values,but disagreements may still exist, so the next section will argue that moral agreements can be reached.