4 结语

信息非对称是社会分工的必然结果，虽然说所有的领域都是相通的，但是信息经济学和新制度经济学关于信息非对称的研究让我们真正领略了隔行如隔山的感觉。对信息化项目建设活动中参与主体之间两种典型的信息非对称行为——不利选择和道德风险（败德行为）的研究，对于信息化项目建设活动达到次优效果或者接近最优效果都是大有裨益的，这也是本论文的创新所在。提出的抵消方法也只是在一定程度上有效，因为信息非对称的状态只能减轻而不能消除，这样不利选择与道德风险就有存在的可能性。

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Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Enterprise's IT Proj ect

ZHAO Limei1,2, ZHANG Qingpu1, WU Guoqiu2

（1.School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China;2.Information Management School, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China）

Abstract IT project in enterprises is a common principal-agent relation, and the enterprises may have two information behaviors—adverse selection and moral hazard in this relationship.This paper first analyses the adverse selection situation from the viewpoint of Lemon Theory which is one of the famous information-asymmetry theories and then elaborates it.Against the enterprises'moral hazard representation in the activity, its causes are analyzed from the viewpoint of information economics.At last the proposed countermeaures will constrain the information behaviors of the two parties—enterprises and software suppliers in the IT project activity.

Key words IT project, Adverse selection, Moral hazard

作者简介

赵丽梅（1979—），哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院博士生，黑龙江大学信息管理学院讲师．E-mail:hdzhaolimei@sina.com。

张庆普（1956—），哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院教授、博士生导师．E-mail:zzqp2000@126.com。

吴国秋（1988—），黑龙江大学信息管理学院2008级本科生．E-mail:daifeideyanzi@163.com。